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Abstract Failing to remember whether we performed, or
merely imagined performing, an everyday action can occa-
sionally be inconvenient, but in some circumstances it can
have potentially dangerous consequences. In this fMRI study,
we investigated the brain activity patterns, and objective and
subjective behavioral measures, associated with recollecting
such everyday actions. We used an ecologically valid “reality-
monitoring” paradigm in which participants performed, or
imagined performing, specified actions with real objects
drawn from one of two boxes. Lateral brain areas, including
prefrontal cortex, were active when participants recollected
both the actions that had been associated with objects and the
locations from which they had been drawn, consistent with a
general role in source recollection. By contrast, medial pre-
frontal and motor regions made more specific contributions,
with supplementary motor cortex activity being associated
with recollection decisions about actions but not locations,
and medial prefrontal cortex exhibiting greater activity when
remembering performed rather than imagined actions. These
results support a theoretical interpretation of reality monitor-
ing that entails the fine-grained discrimination between mul-
tiple forms of internally and externally generated information.
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An example of a memory lapse that is familiar to many
people is the experience of sitting in your car on the way to
work and being unable to remember whether you locked
your front door when you left home, or just thought about
locking it. Similarly, as we age and typically become more
aware of our apparently diminishing memory abilities, we
may become preoccupied with concerns such as whether we
really turned off the gas stove before going to bed, or just
imagined doing so, with obvious consequences for psycho-
logical, and indeed physical, well-being. Indeed, forgetting
whether or not a scheduled pill has already been taken may
be a common reason that people fail to stick to prescribed
medication regimes (Park & Kidder, 1996). Despite the
importance of this memory ability to everyday life, and the
fact that it has been the subject of a number of developmental
and neurophysiological investigations (e.g., Foley &
Johnson, 1985; McDaniel, Lyle, Butler, & Dornburg, 2008;
Senkfor, Petten, & Kutas, 2002), few researchers have
attempted to investigate the brain regions responsible for
recollecting previous actions.
A number of different processes are likely to play a role in
remembering whether or not planned actions were actually
undertaken (McDaniel et al., 2008). For example, recollecting
temporal information may be useful, particularly for actions
that might be faced on multiple occasions. However, a poten-
tially critical factor in discriminating actions that you might
have performed from those you merely imagined may be
“reality monitoring” (Johnson & Raye, 1981), an ability
thought to involve an assessment of the qualitative character-
istics of memory representations. These characteristics may
reflect the kind of processing activity that occurred when a
memory was encoded, perhaps perceptual or semantic details
about an event, or the thoughts and feelings that one had at the
time. Many studies of reality monitoring have contrasted mem-
ories of visually presented stimuli (e.g., words or pictures) with
memories of stimuli that participants were instructed to imag-
ine, with evidence suggesting that assessment of mnemonic
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characteristics such as perceptual detail can often serve as a
useful basis for distinguishing perceived from imagined expe-
riences (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). An emerging
body of functional neuroimaging research has indicated impor-
tant roles for regions of prefrontal (PFC) and parietal cortices in
such decision-making (Mitchell & Johnson, 2009). Lateral PFC
regions are engaged duringmany tasks that involve recollecting
the context in which previous events occurred (Dobbins, Foley,
Schacter, & Wagner, 2002; Dobbins & Han, 2006; Ranganath,
Johnson, & D’Esposito, 2000; Simons, Gilbert, Owen,
Fletcher, & Burgess, 2005), with medial PFC appearing to
make a more specific contribution during judgments that re-
quire differentiating between perceived and imagined informa-
tion (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006; Simons, Davis, Gilbert,
Frith, & Burgess, 2006; Simons, Owen, Fletcher, & Burgess,
2005; Vinogradov et al., 2006).
Recollecting whether we have performed, or merely
imagined performing, everyday actions might involve the
same kind of processing as distinguishing perceived from
imagined words or objects, and might be associated with the
engagement of similar brain regions. Memories of performed
actions may comprise more sensory perceptual detail than do
memories of imagined actions, as well as less information
relating to the cognitive processes involved in generating
vivid imagery-based scenarios. If so, reality monitoring of
action memories would be predicted to elicit activity in
medial PFC regions similar to those identified previously.
However, another view is that discriminating between
performed and imagined actions might, phenomenologically,
be very different from distinguishing perceived from imag-
ined stimuli. Perceived/imagined judgments involve differ-
entiating comparable visual imagery-based representations,
albeit one kind that was generated internally, and one that
was derived from the outside world. In contrast, reality
monitoring of performed/imagined actions could be thought
of as involving a much clearer distinction, between memo-
ries that include information relating to motor processes,
such as visuomotor coordination, muscle control, and kines-
thetic feedback, and memories with no overt motor compo-
nent, instead predominantly comprising internally generated
cognitive operations connected to covert action simulation.
Participants could rely largely on monitoring retrieval for
information relating to motor processes in order to make
their recollection decisions (Nyberg et al., 2001; Senkfor
et al., 2002; Zimmer, Helstrup, & Engelkamp, 2000), in
which case it would be reasonable to expect activity differ-
ences in regions typically associated with motor planning
and action execution, such as premotor cortex and supple-
mentary motor area (Binkofski et al., 1999; for reviews, see
Grèzes & Decety, 2001; Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008).
To examine these issues, we asked participants to per-
form, or imagine performing, specified actions with every-
day objects that the experimenter took from boxes located on
either side of the participant. In a subsequent memory test,
participants were presented with pictures of studied objects
and were scanned using fMRI while recollecting either
whether they had performed or imagined performing actions
with the objects or whether the objects had been taken from
the left or right box. A common nonmemory baseline con-
dition was also included. We predicted that previous findings
of lateral PFC and parietal involvement in general source
recollection processes would be replicated in this paradigm,
with activity being observed during recollection of both
action and location. The main question concerned the in-
volvement of medial PFC and motor regions: If the first
account described above—that reality monitoring of action
memories is analogous to differentiating perceived from
imagined stimuli—is correct, we would predict that patterns
of activity in medial PFC would be observed that would be
similar to those reported by previous studies. On the other
hand, if discriminating performed from imagined actions
requires determining the presence amongst retrieved infor-
mation of overt motor processes, activity differences would
be expected in premotor and supplementary motor areas. To
provide further insight into the kinds of mnemonic charac-
teristics that might enable reality monitoring of action mem-
ories, immediately after leaving the scanner, participants
rated their recollection of each studied object according to
a number of qualitative factors that included the amounts of
internally and externally generated information retrieved.
Method
Participants
The participants were 15 healthy adults (nine female, six
male) between 18 and 38 years old. All of the participants
were right-handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vi-
sion. Before scanning, participants received written informa-
tion about the scanning procedure and were screened using a
comprehensive medical questionnaire. All participants pro-
vided written consent before taking part in the study in a
manner approved by the Cambridge Local Research Ethics
Committee. One additional participant had to be excluded
due to presence of a “wrap around” artifact in the fMRI data
owing to a larger than average head size.
Procedure
The stimuli consisted of 182 action statements involving
small everyday objects (e.g., toy dog, stapler), developed
from a list of 72 action statements created by McDaniel
et al. (2008). In the study phase, which took place outside
the fMRI scanner, the participant sat at a table facing the
experimenter and two large, distinct-looking boxes (blue and
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red) located to the left and right of the participant (see Fig. 1),
each of which contained 80 objects. At the beginning of each
trial, the experimenter took an object out of one of the boxes
and placed it on the table in front of the participant. The
experimenter read aloud an action statement, and partici-
pants were asked either to perform the specified action with
the object or to imagine performing the action without han-
dling the object (e.g., “Perform. Open the book” or “Imagine.
Open the book”). Half of the objects from each box were
assigned to the perform or imagine conditions, with item
order being pseudorandomized such that no more than six
consecutive trials were of the same condition (left box, right
box, perform, imagine). The order in which the 160 objects
were presented was the same for each participant, but four
versions of the task counterbalanced the allocation of each
object to a location (left vs. right box) and task (perform vs.
imagine) across subjects.
In the test phase, which took place some minutes later,
once participants had been set up in the scanner, 160 photo-
graphs were presented of the studied objects, with the blue
and red boxes in the background (see Fig. 1). A cue appeared
at the bottom of the screen instructing the participant to make
one of two possible judgments: “1 = performed 2 = imag-
ined” indicated that participants should recollect whether
they had performed or imagined an action with the object,
or “1 = left 2 = right” indicated that participants should
recollect whether the object had been taken out of the left
or the right box. One second after the cue appeared, an object
picture was presented in the center of the screen, and partic-
ipants were given 3.5 s to make their judgments, which they
Fig. 1 Schematic design of the study and test phases. In the study
phase, real everyday objects were taken out of either the left or the right
box and presented to the participant, who was asked to perform a
specified action with the object or to imagine performing that action
with the object. In the scanned test phase, photographs of the studied
objects were presented, and participants were cued to recollect whether
each object had been associated with a performed or imagined action
(action recollection) or whether it had been taken out of the left or the
right box (location recollection). In the perceptual baseline condition,
participants had to press one of two buttons, according to the number on
the screen
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indicated with a button response. In all, 80 trials were
presented in each recollection condition. The test phase also
included 80 trials of a perceptual baseline condition that
attempted to control for properties of the task such as visual
content, response selection, and so forth, which consisted of
a half-blue, half-red image containing a “1” or a “2” in the
center. In this case, the cue read “1 = press 1 2 = press 2,” and
participants responded appropriately with the button box.
The three conditions were pseudorandomly intermixed with-
in the 240 memory test phase trials, such that no more than
four consecutive trials were of the same condition, with the
allocation of objects to the recollection of left/right versus
performed/imagined conditions counterbalanced across sub-
jects. The intertrial interval was jittered between 480 and
1,380 ms in order to achieve a higher effective sampling rate
over trials.
On leaving the scanner, participants completed a comput-
erized questionnaire assessing the qualitative characteristics
of their memories for the studied everyday objects, on the
basis of Johnson et al.’s (1988) Memory Characteristics
Questionnaire. A picture of each object was presented, and
participants were asked to rate their memory of the relevant
study episode for four different characteristics. The first was
the extent to which their memory for encountering that object
involved specific visual information about the event—for
example, clearly remembering the colors or shape of the
object or of items in the surroundings, the light in the room,
and so forth. The second characteristic related to specific
tactile information about the event, such as the feeling of an
object in the participant’s hand, the feeling of a participant’s
arms against the table or of his or her legs against the chair,
and so forth. The third memory question asked about the
extent to which participants’ memory involved thinking
about their internal feelings or reactions during the study
trial. For example, they may have felt amused or surprised
by an object, bored with the task, an object might have
reminded them of other objects or events that they had
experienced, and so forth. Finally, participants were asked
to indicate the extent to which they had to actively try to
remember the event in order to answer the memory test
question. For example, they may have struggled to remem-
ber and tried very hard, or the memory might have just
popped into their heads without any effort to remember.
Ratings were made on a 5-point scale. Four versions of the
questionnaire counterbalanced the order in which the object
pictures were presented between participants. Each statistical
analysis of the ratings was Bonferroni corrected for multiple
comparisons.
Imaging acquisition and data analysis
A 3-T Siemens TIM Trio system was used to acquire struc-
tural and functional images (TR = 2.25 s; TE = 30 ms; 36
sequential axial slices oriented ~10º–20º to the AC–PC
transverse plane, 2-mm thickness, 1-mm interslice skip;
3 mm × 3 mm in-plane resolution, 64 × 64 pixels; 78º flip
angle; 550 volume acquisitions). The first six volumes were
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration.
The data were analyzed using SPM 8 software (Wellcome
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London). The volumes were
corrected for motion by realigning all images with respect to
the first and were corrected for differences in slice acquisi-
tion timing by resampling all slices in time to match the
middle slice. The realigned volumes were normalized into
3-mm cubic voxels using the Montreal Neurological Institute
(MNI) reference brain using fourth-degree B-spline interpo-
lation, and smoothed with an isotropic 8-mm full-width-at-
half-maximum Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter of
1/128 Hz removed low-frequency noise, and an AR(1) mod-
el corrected for temporal autocorrelation. A random-effects
statistical analysis was undertaken in two stages. First, var-
iance in the blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD)
signal was decomposed with a set of regressors that coded
the onsets of trials associated with correct responses in each
condition, as well as a single error trial regressor, collapsed
across all tasks. Each regressor was generated with delta
functions corresponding to each trial onset, convolved with
a canonical hemodynamic response function. Regressors
representing residual movement related artifacts and the
mean over scans completed the model.
Linear contrasts were used to obtain subject-specific esti-
mates for each of the effects of interest. These estimates were
entered into the second stage of analysis treating subjects as a
random effect, using one-sample t tests across subjects. For
all contrasts, a priori regions of interest for PFC, motor,
and parietal regions were defined as 10-mm spheres centered
on mean coordinates from our previous studies of reality
monitoring (Simons et al., 2006; Simons, Henson, Gilbert,
& Fletcher, 2008; Simons, Owen, et al., 2005) and from
Binkofski et al.’s (1999) study of motor execution invol-
ving manipulable objects. Activations were reported if they
exceeded the family-wise error threshold of p < .05, corrected
for voxels within the region of interest. Activations occurring
outside the regions of interest were reported if they excee-
ded the threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple compari-
sons across the entire brain, and were greater than five voxels
in extent. The peak locations of significant clusters were
localized on an averaged structural scan, with approximate
Brodmann areas obtained from the Talairach and Tournoux
(1988) atlas, after using a nonlinear transform of MNI to
Talairach coordinates (http://imaging.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/
imaging/MniTalairach).
To further explore significant activations elicited in the
regions of interest, mean-percentage-of-signal-change time
courses were extracted from the subject-specific parameter
estimates using a finite impulse response model (Henson,
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2004) and subjected to repeated measures analyses of the
area under the curve (auc) associated with each condition.
These auc values were also used to explore correlations
between brain activity and memory characteristic ratings.
The Bonferroni method corrected for multiple comparisons.
Results
Behavioral results
Recollection accuracy (proportions of responses attributing
items to the correct source) and reaction times for the scanned
retrieval task are displayed in Table 1. Performance was high
but below ceiling in all conditions. An analysis of accuracy
using repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) re-
vealed no significant main effect of study condition (perceived
vs. imagined), F(1, 14) = 0.14, n.s., or retrieval condition
(reality monitoring of action memories vs. location recollec-
tion), F(1, 14) = 1.12, n.s., and no interaction, F(1, 14) = 1.12,
n.s. Arcsine-transforming the accuracy data to control for
possible skewing had no effect on the results: study condition,
F(1, 14) = 0.07, n.s.; retrieval condition, F(1, 14) = 1.41, n.s.;
interaction, F(1, 14) = 0.74, n.s. We observed a trend toward
an effect of study condition on reaction times, F(1, 14) = 3.26,
p = .09, but no effect of retrieval condition, F(1, 14) = 0.14,
n.s. A significant Study Condition × Retrieval Condition
interaction did emerge, F(1, 14) = 19.43, p < .01, driven by
slower reaction times when participants were making reality-
monitoring judgments for actions that had previously been
imagined than for actions that had previously been performed,
t(14) = 4.89, p < .001, but no corresponding difference be-
tween performed and imagined actions for location retrieval
judgments, t(14) = 0.26, n.s.
Memory characteristics questionnaire
Examination of memory characteristic ratings (Table 2) re-
vealed that memories of objects that had been involved in
performed actions were rated as being significantly greater in
internal, t(14) = 2.97, p = .01, and tactile, t(14) = 4.9, p <
.001, detail than were objects that had been involved in
imagined actions. We found no difference in terms of amount
of visual detail, but participants did rate memories of
performed actions as requiring significantly less effort to
retrieve than did those of imagined actions, t(14) = 3.6, p <
.01. Examining retrieval condition effects, reality monitoring
of action memories was rated as requiring less effort than did
location recollection, t(14) = 2.6, p < .05, although this effect
did not survive Bonferroni correction; no other effects of the
type of source recollection were apparent.
Neuroimaging results
To determine the brain regions that were involved more
during successful recollection than during the baseline con-
dition, regardless of the kind of source detail retrieved,
inclusive masking was used to identify common regions
showing significant activity in both action and location rec-
ollection pairwise comparisons against baseline (Table 3).
As is displayed in Fig. 2, we observed considerable overlap
between the two kinds of recollection in a number of regions,
including left ventrolateral PFC, anterior cingulate, and
precuneus, as well as bilateral parietal, fusiform, and occip-
ital cortices. Comparing the two recollection conditions
against one another revealed that an inferior portion of left
ventrolateral PFC (centered at −45, 32, 4; BA 45; Z = 3.8)
and supplementary motor area (−12, 20, 58; BA 6/8; Z = 3.2)
were significantly more active during reality monitoring of
action memories (Fig. 3a), whereas location recollection was
associated with greater activity in a region of the precuneus
(−3, –70, 55; BA 7; Z = 3.6) (Fig. 3b). As we noted in the
behavioral results, no significant differences in retrieval ac-
curacy or reaction times emerged between the two source
recollection conditions, precluding an explanation of the
neuroimaging results in terms of task difficulty.
Table 1 Recollection accuracy and reaction time data as a function of
study condition (performed vs. imagined actions) and test condition
(action vs. location recollection)
Condition Accuracy Reaction time (ms)
Mean SD Mean SD
Action Recollection
Performed .93 .07 1,630 178
Imagined .93 .06 1,748 176
Location Recollection
Performed .92 .05 1,681 307
Imagined .91 .07 1,671 258
Table 2 Postscan memory characteristics questionnaire: mean ratings
of amount of internally generated thoughts/associations retrieved,
amounts of tactile and visual detail, and effort required at retrieval
Condition Internal Tactile Visual Effort
Action Recollection
Performed 2.99 3.87 4.02 1.57
Imagined 2.60 2.40 3.99 1.87
Location Recollection
Performed 2.97 3.68 4.07 1.69
Imagined 2.56 2.51 3.93 1.95
Ratings were made on a 5-point scale, with higher numbers meaning
greater amounts of richness/detail/effort.
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In a subsequent analysis, we examined the brain areas
associated specifically with recollecting whether actions were
performed or imagined, with location recollection acting as a
control. As can be seen in Fig. 3c, the only area of the brain to
exhibit significant activity in the interaction contrast [action
recollection (performed – imagined)] – [location recollection
(performed – imagined)] was anterior medial PFC (centered
on −6, 56, 13; BA 10; Z = 4.3). Inspecting the time course of
activity in this region (Fig. 4a) confirmed the interaction, F(1,
14) = 11.57, p < .005, which was attributable to significantly
greater activity during reality-monitoring judgments for ac-
tions that had previously been performed than for actions that
had previously been imagined, t(14) = 3.49, p < .005, but no
corresponding difference for location recollection, t(14) =
0.72, p = .48. Signal in this region during the reality monitor-
ing of performed actions, as compared with the mean across
all conditions, correlated significantly with the amount of
internal detail that participants rated their action recollection
judgments as involving (Fig. 5), r(13) = .64, p = .01. A
significant nonparametric Spearman correlation verified that
the strength of this association was not attributable solely to
the participant who exhibited the highest activity, rs(13) = .56,
p < .05. The correlation of anterior medial PFC signal with
rated tactile detail, r(13) = .36, was not significant, given the
small sample size, p = .19, and we found no correlations with
rated visual detail, r(13) = −.04, or effort, r(13) = −.07. The
apparent specificity of the link between activity in this
region during reality monitoring of performed actions
and rated internal detail was evidenced by the observa-
tion that the correlation was not significant when loca-
tion recollection of performed actions was used as the
dependent measure, r(13) = .37.
The reverse interaction [action recollection (imagined –
performed)] – [location recollection (imagined – performed)]
elicited significant activity in left precuneus (−12, –67, 61;
BA 7; Z = 3.4), located slightly more laterally than the
cluster that emerged from the location-versus-action-rec-
ollection contrast. The significant interaction was driven
by greater activity during location recollection judgments
for performed than for imagined actions, t(14) = 3.13, p < .01,
but no difference in the reality monitoring of action memories,
t(14) = 1.15, p = .27 (Fig. 4b). Signal in this region did not
correlate significantly with any of the memory character-
istic ratings, and Williams’s (1959) test for nonindependent
correlations revealed that anterior medial PFC activity
was a significantly better predictor of rated internal
detail than was precuneus signal, t(12) = 2.45, p < .05. No
significant activity in either interaction contrast was observed
in motor areas.
Note that the behavioral results included no significant
study or test condition differences in terms of recollection
accuracy, and significantly slower reaction times during real-
ity monitoring of actions that had previously been imagined
than for actions that had previously been performed. Addi-
tionally, overall, participants rated their reality-monitoring
judgments for action memories as requiring significantly less
Table 3 Regions showing significant activity common to both action
and location recollection versus the baseline condition
Brain Region Coordinates
x y z Z
Regions of Interest From Previous Studies
Left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 45) −51 29 22 4.1
Anterior cingulate cortex (BA 32) −6 17 49 5.6
Left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 44) −42 8 31 3.8
Left intraparietal sulcus (BA 40) −30 −55 49 4.6
Right intraparietal sulcus (BA 40) 36 −46 46 4.0
Precuneus (BA 7) −9 −70 43 3.5
Additional Significant Regions
Posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23) 6 −31 28 5.3
Brainstem (BA 27) 6 −28 −5 5.4
Right fusiform cortex (BA 37) 39 −37 −20 5.1
Right fusiform cortex (BA 37) 30 −52 −14 6.1
Left fusiform cortex (BA 37) −27 −58 −11 5.4
Left occipital cortex (BA 18) −33 −88 10 5.8
Right occipital cortex (BA 18) 21 −88 −8 5.4
Left occipital cortex (BA 18) −6 −94 −11 5.4
Coordinates are in MNI atlas space (Cocosco, Kollokian, Kwan, &
Evans, 1997), with brain regions and Brodmann areas (BAs) estimated
from the Talairach and Tournoux (1988) atlas. Activations within re-
gions of interest are reported that exceeded the threshold of p < .05,
corrected for voxels within the region. Additional significant regions
reported exceeded the threshold of p < .05, corrected for multiple
comparisons across the entire brain.
Fig. 2 Brain regions activated during both action and location recol-
lection, relative to the nonmemory baseline condition, displayed at an
uncorrected threshold of p < .001. Considerable overlap between the
two kinds of recollection is seen in regions that include lateral prefron-
tal, parietal, fusiform, and occipital cortices, all significant at the
corrected thresholds (see the text for details)
214 Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci (2014) 14:209–219
effort than those for location recollection. Thus, a dif-
ference in task difficulty, however estimated, cannot provide
a satisfactory explanation for the effects observed in the
neuroimaging data.
Fig. 3 Brain regions active during the action memory task at the
threshold of p < .05, corrected for voxels within regions of interest.
(a) Action recollection was associated with significantly greater activity
than was location recollection in left ventrolateral PFC (left panel) and
in supplementary motor area (right panel). (b) Location recollection
resulted in greater medial parietal activity, including the precuneus, as
compared with recollection of actions. (c) Medial prefrontal cortex was
the only area of the brain to show significantly greater activity specif-
ically during action recollection of performed rather than imagined
actions
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Discussion
In this study, we sought to characterize the neurocognitive pro-
cesses involved in reality monitoring for action memories—the
ability to distinguish performed and imagined everyday actions.
We investigated brain activity patterns, and objective and sub-
jective behavioral measures, elicited by recollecting the actions
that had been associated with everyday objects and the locations
from which the objects had been drawn. Previous studies using
paradigms that involved distinguishing perceived from imagined
stimuli raised the possibility that regions of medial PFCmight be
important for distinguishing the “reality” of performed or imag-
ined actions. However, generalization from studies involving the
viewing of two-dimensional pictures of objects to the performing
of actions with real three-dimensional objects cannot be assumed
(Hintzman, 2011; Snow et al., 2011), and it may have been that
reality monitoring of action memories can be accomplished
simply by monitoring retrieval for records of motor processes,
with associated activity in premotor or supplementary motor
regions. The results revealed the involvement of both medial
PFC and motor regions, with supplementary motor cortex activ-
ity being associated with decisions about actions but not about
locations, and medial PFC activity reflecting the fine-grained
discrimination between multiple forms of internally and exter-
nally generated information. We consider interpretations of these
findings below.
Focusing first on brain regions playing a general role in
recollection, contrasts of both action and location recollection
against baseline were associated with common areas of activ-
ity in ventrolateral PFC, anterior cingulate, and precuneus, as
well as in bilateral parietal cortex and extensive areas of the
fusiform and occipital cortices. Many of these regions have
Fig. 4 Time course analysis of activity during the action recollection
and location recollection tasks in (a) anterior medial prefrontal cortex
(amPFC), indicating greater activity specifically during reality-
monitoring judgments about performed rather than imagined actions,
and (b) precuneus, indicating greater activity specifically during
location recollection judgments about performed rather than imagined
actions
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previously been observed to be activated during a variety of
source tasks, such as those that involve recollecting where
(Gilbert, Henson, & Simons, 2010; Simons et al., 2006;
Simons, Owen, et al., 2005) or when (Simons, Gilbert, et al.,
2005; Turner, Simons, Gilbert, Frith, & Burgess, 2008) a
stimulus was previously encountered, as well as details such
as its size (Dobbins &Wagner, 2005; Ranganath et al., 2000),
whether it was perceived or imagined by the participant
(Simons et al., 2006; Simons et al., 2008; Turner et al.,
2008), read aloud by the participant or the experimenter
(Lagioia et al., 2011; Simons et al., 2008), studied as a word
or a picture (Nolde, Johnson, & D’Esposito, 1998), or studied
in the context of one or the other orienting task (Dobbins et al.,
2002; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; Kahn, Davachi, & Wagner,
2004; Simons, Owen, et al., 2005).
Although the present design did not allow for different stages
of the reality-monitoring process to be distinguished, previous
evidence suggests that some lateral PFC regions may play a
preretrieval role during recollection, setting up strategies or ver-
ification criteria for retrieval—processes that have been termed
retrieval orientation (Dobbins et al., 2002; Dobbins & Wagner,
2005; Ranganath et al., 2000; Simons, Gilbert, et al., 2005). For
example, lateral PFC activity has been linked with cue specifi-
cation and elaboration processes occurring prior to the instigation
of a reality-monitoring retrieval search (Dobbins et al., 2002;
Simons, Gilbert, et al., 2005), associated with the presentation of
retrieval instructions rather than target stimuli (Simons et al.,
2008). These regions may form part of a preretrieval network
that includes more posterior brain areas such as fusiform cortex,
as we observed in the present data, reflecting the manner in
which retrieval may be controlled via attention to perceptual
representations of presented cues and stimuli (Simons, Gilbert,
et al., 2005).
Turning to brain regions with a particular role in memory for
actions, greater activity during reality monitoring of action mem-
ories than for location recollection was observed in left ventro-
lateral PFC and supplementary motor area. This is consistent
with an account in which retrieved information relating to the
motor processes that were engaged during the study phase is
maintained online and forms at least part of the basis for making
action-related reality-monitoring decisions (Nyberg et al., 2001;
Senkfor et al., 2002; Zimmer et al., 2000). It is notable that motor
regions have not been among those reported by previous reality-
monitoring studies as exhibiting activity that distinguished per-
ceived from imagined information (e.g., Simons et al., 2006;
Simons et al., 2008). However, future studies directly comparing
performed–imagined and perceived–imagined tasks are needed
to confirm that motor cortex activity is specific to reality moni-
toring for action memories.
One brain region that appears to play a key role during all
kinds of reality-monitoring tasks is medial PFC, which in the
present data was not sensitive to the non-reality-monitoring task
of recollecting stimulus location, but exhibited significantly
greater activity during reality monitoring of performed versus
Fig. 5 Scatterplots illustrating correlations between anterior medial
prefrontal cortex (amPFC) activity during action recollection and
postscan memory characteristics questionnaire ratings, identifying an
association with ratings of retrieved internal detail (see the text for
details; auc = area under curve)
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imagined actions. Insight into this result is provided by partic-
ipants’ qualitative memory characteristic ratings, which indicat-
ed that greater retrieval of internally generated information
occurred during recollection of performed than of imagined
actions. Furthermore, signal in the peak anterior medial PFC
voxel correlated significantly with ratings of internal detail
retrieved during action recollection judgments. This rating pat-
tern must be interpreted with caution, given the small sample
size, but it can be considered in the context of Johnson and
colleagues’ reality-monitoring framework (Johnson et al.,
1988; Johnson & Raye, 1981) as suggesting that memory for
performed actions might involve differentiating internally gen-
erated context details such as goal specification, movement
planning, grasp point selection, and object weight estimation,
as well as externally generated details such as tactile and other
sensory perceptual processes. Furthermore, touching an every-
day object and performing a familiar action with it may trigger
additional internally generated memories and associations that
might not be retrieved when imagining the action. Evidence
suggests that participants regularly make use of fine-grained
distinctions between such qualitative characteristics when mak-
ing reality-monitoring judgments (Johnson et al., 1988;
McDaniel et al., 2008), and the present data indicate that this
principle may also apply when determining the reality of action
memories.
The present findings add to previous indications that
medial PFC regions are sensitive to subtle differences in
the degrees of internally or externally generated information
that are required when making recollection decisions. Activ-
ity in this region has been reported when memory for the
study task previously undertaken with stimuli is contrasted
against the location (Gilbert et al., 2010; Simons, Owen,
et al., 2005), the time (Simons, Gilbert, et al., 2005), or the
size (Dobbins & Wagner, 2005) of the stimuli. Other con-
trasts found to elicit differential medial PFC activity include
recollecting whether stimuli were perceived or imagined
(Simons et al., 2006; Simons et al., 2008; Turner et al.,
2008) or whether they were generated by oneself or by an
external agent (Lagioia et al., 2011; Simons et al., 2008).
These functional imaging findings have recently been
supplemented by evidence of a specific structural basis for
reality monitoring in medial PFC. Individual differences in
reality-monitoring ability in healthy volunteers were associ-
ated with morphological variability in the paracingulate sul-
cus, a tertiary sulcus in medial PFC that varies greatly in size
between individuals (Buda, Fornito, Bergström, & Simons,
2011). Although attempting to locate sulcal landmarks on an
averaged MRI scan is problematic, the medial PFC activity
observed in the present data does appear to be in the vicinity
of the participants’ average paracingulate sulcus location
(most clearly illustrated in the right panel of Fig. 3c). In the
present experiment, only correctly recollected trials were
included in the fMRI analysis; future studies could contrast
the activity associated with correct and incorrect recollection
in order to distinguish whether activity is contingent on
retrieval success.
To conclude, we used a reality-monitoring paradigm, in
conjunction with both objective and subjective behavioral
measures, to provide insights into the neurocognitive mecha-
nisms involved in remembering everyday actions. A number
of brain areas contributed to recollection generally, whether
this involved retrieving the actions performed with real ob-
jects or the location from which the objects were drawn.
Medial PFC and supplementary motor areas exhibited activity
differences that were specific to the reality monitoring of
action memories, consistent with memory for performed ac-
tions relying on monitoring of internally generated motoric
processes and externally derived sensory perceptual details.
This result converges with previous functional and structural MRI
findings to support a theoretical interpretation of realitymonitoring
that involves the fine-grained qualitative discrimination between
themultiple characteristics of eventmemory representations. Eval-
uating the relative extents of internally and externally generated
detail that comprise our memories could allow us reliably to
distinguish real experiences from those that we might have imag-
ined, a decision-making ability that can have important implica-
tions for our well-being.
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